I connected our SAP with Microsoft Sentinel but the customer's IP address is not coming from the SAPAuditLog table. It brings several data but no IP address. Would it be something I have to enable in SAP? Has anyone integrated SAP with Sentinel? ... View more

SAP is proud to announce its partnership with the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC)   SAP believes strongly in the power of collective action, especially when it comes to the security of our people, products, assets and our hundreds of thousands of customers. For decades, SAP has invested in public - private partnerships as an essential component of building a strong defensive capacity.   We also believe in the power of technology to transform society.  SAP’s mission is to help the world run better and improve people’s lives with sustainability at its core.  We engineer solutions to fuel innovation, foster equality and spread opportunity across borders and cultures.  Nonetheless, we recognize that inherent in the power of technology is the danger that malicious actors will co-opt innovative solutions for their own nefarious purposes. Thus, ensuring our solutions are secure and inspiring trust in our customers is critical to the mission of SAP.    As threat landscapes rapidly evolve in response to innovation, it is incumbent upon network defenders to adapt security models and address constantly shifting and aggressive threat vectors. Given the interconnected nature of modern digital networks and supply chains, information sharing and operational coordination with partners across government, industry and academia is more important than ever in keeping pace with emerging threats and acting quickly to secure and protect society.  SAP Joins JCDC  Effective today, SAP is pleased to join with multiple government and private sector entities in the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC). The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) established JCDC in August 2021 to transform traditional public-private partnerships into real-time private-public operational collaboration and shift the paradigm from reacting to threats and vulnerabilities to proactively planning and taking steps to mitigate them. JCDC combines the visibility, insight, and innovation of the private sector with the capabilities and authorities of the federal cyber ecosystem to collectively drive down cyber risk to the nation at scale.   SAP looks forward to contributing actively to this powerful network of cyber defenders to collect, share and widely distribute timely actionable, cyber threat information and collaborate on operational strategies to better secure the global digital ecosystem.  For more information about SAP Global Security, please visit the SAP Trust Center . ... View more

Question, CVE-2022-34305 is not listed in the VCE's that SAP BI is not vulnerable to. Is SAP BI 4.3 SP 2 Patch 3 vulnerable to this? The referenced version of Apache Tomcat is one of the vulnerable versions. https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/2914574 Finding details: The version of Tomcat installed on the remote host is prior to 9.0.65. It is, therefore, affected by a vulnerability as referenced in the fixed_in_apache_tomcat_9.0.65_security-9 advisory. - In Apache Tomcat 10.1.0-M1 to 10.1.0-M16, 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.22, 9.0.30 to 9.0.64 and 8.5.50 to 8.5.81 the Form authentication example in the examples web application displayed user provided data without filtering, exposing a XSS vulnerability. (CVE-2022-34305) Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number. ... View more

Are there standard Airworthiness forms and reports in either Aerospace and Defense OR Defense and Security Solutions? As example a AWIA-Airworthiness Impact Assessment ... View more

Hello All, Hope you are well and taking very good care of yourself ! I just want to know if there are any tools which shows whether particular S-Note is having manual correction and how it can be implemented? Thank you! ... View more

For defense organizations worldwide, acquiring integrated logistics support (ILS) data from their OEMs has become a largely routine process. Most governments have established or adopted standards and specifications for defense OEMs to format and transmit the ILS data required to support nearly all military assets, and they receive the data products along with the article being procured. Unfortunately, even though OEMs generally provide exactly what is requested, the data itself isn’t always exploited for its true value. ILS data packages come in different formats and sources, depending on the needs of the specific discipline along the system’s life cycle it is intended to serve. Ideally, a full suite of ILS data allows for complete and total support of an item or system from its development to its disposal. Regrettably, a wealth of ILS data elements is never made available beyond their designated purpose, which limits usefulness and adds effort and cost that can impact readiness. Access to all ILS data by any activity supporting the item or system can be a game changer. Information access is limited Optimized ILS data access is not only critical for field-level maintenance teams who are traditionally limited to whatever information made it into the technical manuals, but to the intermediate and depot teams who service and rebuild military assets entirely. Military, OEM, and third-party service providers are often challenged by a lack of data more focused on a system’s design than to its support. Without robust mechanisms in place to retrieve all information relevant to an item with a few mouse clicks, especially engineering and design data, service and support teams must resort to reverse engineering and inefficient workarounds to do their jobs. That’s why having access to every ILS data element can dramatically improve readiness. Too many inefficiencies built into the data chain The inefficiencies aren’t limited to transfers of ILS data from OEMs to their defense customers, they also exist within the OEMs themselves. A big challenge is that data doesn’t always flow from one team to the next within many OEM operations. The engineering data used to design the aircraft, the production data used to build it, and the service data used to maintain it after delivery all tend to remain within their respective teams and systems. Too often for a given system or part, the relevant OEM design data (e.g., the actual blueprint for a part or its input/output data) tends to remain within the engineering silo. It doesn’t easily flow downstream for reuse by teams developing reliant support products such as test equipment, technical publications, and training systems. Without easy access to this data, OEM support product teams are left on their own to modify existing data products from previous programs or even develop them from scratch. These inefficiencies can add technical, cost, and schedule risk; reduce product quality; and result in lower customer confidence and satisfaction. Moving beyond manuals to co-innovate with OEMs While OEMs work to break their own information silos, their defense customers (and third-party servicers) need to move beyond OEM technical manuals to have all ILS data at their fingertips. At a minimum, organizations need to do a better job of unlocking access to the data they already have, making it available wherever, whenever, and to whomever it’s needed to improve readiness. Defense organizations should be able to accept, use, and share ILS data instantly – regardless of its format or source and no matter how OEMs send the data. With greater system-to-system integration and real-time sharing of ILS data, defense customers can co-innovate with OEMs. In addition, by having access to every bit of knowledge related to a specific OEM part of system, defense customers can actually help OEMs to identify and troubleshoot problems that may affect entire fleets. Intelligent automation can help break ILS data silos Today’s data intelligence tools can help defense organizations find and retrieve ILS data wherever it resides, and deliver access on demand to any authorized individual, team, or system. This reduces complexity because no one has to make changes to existing data or proprietary systems. Legacy data can remain as-is in internal systems as well as OEM and third-party systems; there’s no need for data duplication or updating interfaces and master data to establish system-to-system connectivity. By leveraging artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies to automate ILS data access, defense organizations can significantly improve operational agility and responsiveness. Data can be delivered in real time to accelerate maintenance tasks and improve operational readiness, and data can be traced and verified across complex networks to improve auditability. And that’s a big win for defense organizations as well as their external stakeholders. ... View more

Like everyone else, I’ve been thinking a lot about the future of work in the midst of Covid-19. And while the global pandemic will recede, it is also clear that one of its lasting legacies is a permanently changed workplace. And what are those changes? The ones we are already making to deal with two big Covid-19-related workplace challenges: preventing people from touching things and maintaining safe physical distances.   Organizations around the world have already incurred significant costs to establish and maintain touch-safe and socially distant operations to keep everyone safe and the military community is no exception. But just stopping at the costs of installing those safety measures leaves your organization with only those incurred costs. How can military organizations turn the costs of a Covid-19-safe workplace into opportunities to increase value and improve readiness?   Shared devices replaced by highly enabled personal devices How do you keep the kiosk-style computer in the aircraft hangar or maintenance shop floor safe and sanitary for every user? The kind of machine everyone logs in and out of before and after use. Do you wear gloves and other PPE each time and then throw away? That can work but it’s a big sustainability issue and PPE should be reserved for critical uses.   Moving forward the use of shared devices will be minimized if not eliminated entirely as the use of personal devices increase, and that’s exactly where the opportunities lie. Personal devices – such as smartphones, tablets, and laptops – will be enhanced with new applications and interaction modes that align with each individual’s role and method of work. A helicopter repair technician with their hands full needs to interact with their tablet by speaking – and the tablet must distinguish the speaker’s voice over the surrounding noise of a busy aircraft hangar as well as understand the specialized vocabulary and context of aviation maintenance.   What’s more, the technician with their hands full will still need diagrams and information based on the specific parts, components, or area of aircraft – information only available on the tablet screen. That’s why the AI-enabled maintenance application on the tablet will deliver enriched, in-context information through augmented reality (AR) glasses worn by the technician.   Smarter spaces and even smarter remote support Are human beings really needed to register someone coming into a building – even for a Covid-19-related health screening? All of it can be done remotely and securely, using facial recognition to match faces to registration details, voice-enabled chat bots to conduct contact tracing and ask follow up questions, and smart sensors that can take your temperature. With sensors throughout the building, facilities can monitor capacity and where people are in the building, granting or limiting access to specific workspaces as needed.   And keeping distance is equally important back in the maintenance hangar – so instead of a technician working side by side with a more senior individual – the technician can get remote support through a camera feed in their AR glasses. Technicians will be able to rely on Tier-1 support using chat bots and other intelligent robotic technology, thereby prioritizing human support for more complex support tasks.   5G as catalyst for work and workspace reinvention For these technology-driven changes to be possible requires a tremendous amount of network bandwidth. The AR-enabled operator in a facility or in the field is always connected in real time, exchanging gigabytes of data simultaneously across multiple video, voice, and data feeds, and many operators have to be supported at the same time. That level of bandwidth and service was simply not available until 5G.   A private 5G network has the range, bandwidth, and security to make this kind of interaction seamless and meet the high-level of service necessary for military-grade performance and reliability. Another critical advantage is that the 5G network can be segmented, so that either voice, video, or data can be prioritized depending on the service needs for that particular segment.   New ways to interact with spaces and machines New innovations that would otherwise have taken many more years to emerge are happening right now in response to the pandemic. For example, the challenge of the interior navigation of a building or ship – a challenge solved years ago for external navigation by GPS – can now be mastered with 5G.   A facility-wide 5G and proximity sensor network connected to an intelligent ERP solution can track the distribution of people for a variety of scenarios. These can include monitoring and reserving capacity for high-use interior areas of a ship such as mess halls and gyms or guiding crew members to those spaces at designated times using AR-highlighted routes that minimize human contact. A smart facility may even detect if someone alone in a room has suddenly fallen or had a medical emergency.   In the months and years to come, these technologies will be leveraged in new and imaginative ways to create safer, more-productive work environments. And just as we have witnessed in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, these new capabilities will balloon as the pace of innovation accelerates exponentially for both military and civilian applications. ... View more

Technological advancement has had, undoubtedly, many positive impacts for humanity, but it raises complicated questions in the context of increasing global unrest and the changing nature of warfare, national security and international dispute resolution.  Hostile actors, from lone political activists and financially-motivated criminals to international criminal and terrorist organizations, now possess the capability to digitally, and anonymously, launch devastating attacks and breaches of critical infrastructure and information systems in the physical world, which equal or supersede the destructive power of the conventional weapons of war. The Evolution of the “battlespace” and the modern combatant Generally, software that can be digitally deployed to disrupt an adversary’s critical infrastructure, can be considered a weapon of cyber warfare. Such malware is often identical to the weapons of cyber criminals, hacktivists or any other malicious cyber actor.  Though increasingly sophisticated technology can facilitate precision placement of specific malware to achieve tailored goals, malware can easily spread to third parties and other connected entities within a network or intersecting networks and have unintended consequences.  Given the enhanced digital connectivity between government and private commercial interests in the modern economy, this dynamic represents a significant threat that can exceed the malicious actor’s intent and cause significant collateral damage. While history is replete with examples of the failure by organized nations to minimize collateral damage to non-combatant persons and assets, international law and protocols have created generally accepted standards of conduct.  The blurred connectivity of cyber combatants to a central war planning and analysis element when mounting offensive operations reduces the likelihood that these operations are guided by battle damage assessments and provides little to no accountability.  This is a sure-fire recipe for eventual chaos as highly destructive operations are planned and executed in a strategic vacuum. New instruments, same tune “We are currently under attack.”  Those were the words of a concerned student at the University of California, Berkley, in an email sent shortly after a malicious program was unleashed on the Internet from a computer located at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  The program was a worm that self-propagated and targeted computers running a specific version of an operating system.  The worm also utilized multiple attack vectors, including stealth, backdoor access to email systems, and overcoming network ID verification protocols.  Because the targeted operating system was used by the country’s leading research institutions, the worm’s victims included UC Berkley, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Johns Hopkins, NASA, and the Livermore National Laboratory.  The year was 1988. The outcome of this event was a greater appreciation of the fact that computers are vulnerable and the need for greater security.  This prompted the Department of Defense to direct the creation of the country’s first computer emergency response team. Just over 30 years later, and following countless lesser worm attacks, the world faced what has been referred to as the most devastating cyberattack in history. In June 2017, the NotPetya cyberattack occurred, causing staggering collateral damage.  Like the worm in 1988, NotPetya was engineered to spread on its own accord, both quickly and without a concrete direction.  However, while the 1988 worm was designed by an inquisitive grad student, NotPetya was the offspring of stolen military grade programming created by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) married with a researcher’s proof of concept used to demonstrate that residual password information resided in a computer’s memory.  The result was a program that left an estimated $10 billion of destruction in its wake. Expanding Strategic Vulnerabilities Critical government systems and assets, such as sensitive facilities, high-level officials, major infrastructure and data, will remain primary targets of hostile actions of cyber warfare but the greater maturity of government cybersecurity defenses will divert the focus of marauding forces toward “softer” targets which offer ultimate access to the same critical assets, even if the route is more circuitous.  As such, private industry will find itself much more in the crosshairs of offensive actions than previous conventions permitted.  Industries with direct supply-chain connections to critical government assets, like aerospace and defense contractors, and industries that are considered vital to US power, such as oil and energy, financial services and banking and telecommunications and media, will be attractive targets.  Other attractive targets will be less obvious industries such as healthcare, hospitality and manufacturing which possess massive amounts of valuable personally identifiable information (PII) and proprietary intellectual property which can be coopted for strategic advantage or to facilitate operations that compromise or weaken an adversary’s power.  As illustrative examples, the 2017 Equifax and the 2018 Marriott breaches, initially suspected to be the work of cyber criminals, are now widely believed to have been hostile intelligence collection operations carried out by Chinese intelligence networks seeking to obtain sensitive financial and travel pattern data on key US government officials to identify opportunities for compromise.  The hundreds of thousands of other individuals impacted by these breaches, while not primary targets, become collateral victims whose data can be utilized for multiple purposes that leave them susceptible to future exploitation. As such, organizations of all shapes and sizes must evaluate cybersecurity in the context of a much more symbiotic ecosystem where size, economic might and direct connectivity matter less in assessing vulnerability and criticality to national security than the nature and extent of internal and external relationships and the general utility and manipulability of data that constitutes their “stock-in-trade.” Society’s Obligation To Prevent Cyberattacks U.S. Government interagency technical guidance has been created to aid organizations in preparing for, detecting and recovering from a cyberattack.  The guidance recommends implementing training programs, utilizing strong spam filters, scanning emails, blocking known malicious IP addresses, engaging in regular patch management, and utilizing anti-malware programs, just to name a few basic steps.  Some additional recommendations that are more complex include limiting access to certain files, disabling macro scripts, implementing software restriction policies, and whitelisting programs and email addresses.  Business continuity preparation also figures largely in the guidance, requiring regular back-ups of data that is then secured, and periodic penetration testing and vulnerability assessments. The evaluation of cybersecurity in the context of porous interconnectivity requires the implementation of robust countermeasures and remaining vigilant for new threats.  The inescapable key to the success of these efforts is the education of personnel within an organization, with each person making up one link in the chain that is cybersecurity Prevention of cyberattacks centers on each of us adopting a culture of cybersecurity that should have its origins at the leadership level of every organization.  Societal obligations require this approach as a matter of national security, much like the social distancing we have all been forced to recently undertake.   Bio Niall Brennan is VP for Strategic Security Partnerships and Engagement with SAP Global Security.  He is based in New York City.  He has over 29 years of experience in a variety of legal, advisory and investigative roles in both the public and private sectors. Niall retired in 2018 from a 22-year career with the FBI, during which he served in multiple operational and managerial capacities in virtually all investigative and investigative support programs.  He has extensive crisis management and international experience and, in his last position, led the FBI office in the American Embassy in Paris, France for over 5 years.  Prior to joining SAP, he was a Director in PwC’s Cybersecurity & Privacy practice.    ... View more

Has anyone in our community had any experience in interfacing SAP DMS to Objective ECM records management application? We have a requirement to provide maintenance documents (Specific Doc Types) as part of our objective quality evidence on completion of works from SAP to our clients Records management application (Objective ECM). Our intent was to develop this as a Webservice and pass the docs through the interface directly to Objective ECM. Our client is also on SAP but these documents must be loaded into Objective in the first instance and not clients DMS. Any experience in this field and advice on options will be greatly appreciated. ... View more

How I can exclude to WEB-explorer name of user SAPSYS? Security department requirements. ErrorCode:ICF-NF-http-c:000-u:SAPSYS-l:R-i:PIP_11-v:0-s:404-r:Notfound WEB-explorer get: http://100.200.1.80:8000 ... View more