This document was generated from the following discussion: Recommended Settings for the Security Audit Log (SM19 / SM20)

This blog had started to give recommendations about settings for the Security Audit Log, but in the meantime it had evolved to show tips & tricks in general.

Another sound source for information are the FAQ notes 539404 “FAQ: Answers to questions about the Security Audit Log” and 2191612 “FAQ | Use of Security Audit Log as of NetWeaver 7.50”.

Contents

Profile Parameters / Kernel Parameters

rsau/enable = 1

rsau/selection_slots = 10 (or higher if available)

rsau/user_selection = 1

DIR_AUDIT and FN_AUDIT define the path and the file name pattern for the log files.

As of release SAP_BASIS 7.40 you can use the so-called “Kernel Parameters” instead of the listed Profile Parameters. You find them on a new tab in transaction SM19. See chapter Preparing the Security Audit Log in the Online Documentation. You can set them dynamically and once set they overwrite the values of the profile parameters. Take care to inspect these Kernel Parameters after an upgrade to SAP_BASIS 7.40 or higher.>

Filter settings in SM19

Depending on the release you can set 10, 15 (as of SAP_BASIS 7.40 SP 8) or 90 (as of SAP_BASIS 7.50 SP 2) filters. See FAQ Note 539404 item [4].

1. Filter: Activate everything which is critical for all users ‘*’ in all clients  ‘*’.

  • You may deactivate the messages of class “User master record change (32)” because you get change documents for users in transaction SUIM anyway.
  • Consider to add messages AUO, AUZ, BU5, BU6, BU7, BU9, BUA, BUB BUC, BUH, AUP, AUQ
  • If you maintain logical file names using transaction FILE (see note 1497003) than add messages CUQ, CUR, CUS, CUT, DU5
  • If you maintain an Access Control List for RFC callback (see note 2128095) than add messages DUI, DUJ, DUK

2. Filter: Activate everything for special user SAP* in all clients ‘*’

You cannot use a filter ‘SAP*’ because this would include the virtual user SAPSYS because of profile parameter rsau/user_selection = 1. This virtual user SAPSYS performs many house-keeping activities triggered by the system itself. You do not want to log these events.

However, you can use the special filter value ‘SAP#*’ instead.

You can use this special filter value ‘SAP#*’ in transaction SM20 or report RSAU_SELECT_EVENTS as well to show log entries in for user SAP* only.

If you can defines filters for user groups (see note 2285879) then you can create filters for user groups like SUPER instead. This has the additional advantage that the built-in user SAPSYS does not produce any logs.

3+4. Filter: Activate everything for other support and emergency users, e.g. ‘SAPSUPPORT*’ (SAP Support users) respective ‘FF*’ (FireFighter) in all clients ‘*’.

If you can defines filters for user groups then you can create filters for corresponding user groups instead.

5. Filter: Activate all events for the dialog activities ‘logon’ and ‘transaction’ for user ‘DDIC’ in all clients ‘*’. This user should not be used in dialog mode. It’s only required for specific activities while applying support packages or while importing transports (however in this case you can use another background user as well).

6. Filter: Activate everything for client ‘066’. This client is not used anymore and can be deleted (see  http://scn.sap.com/community/security/blog/2013/06/06/how-to-remove-unused-clients-including-client-001-and-066 ).

7. Filter: Activate RFC events (AUL, AUK, AU6, AU5) for a short time for selected users to identity RFC connection problems easily (see http://scn.sap.com/community/security/blog/2010/12/05/how-to-get-rfc-call-traces-to-build-authorizations-for-srfc-for-free ).

8. and following Filter: free for other project specific purpose
The client field accepts either single values like 000 or a * to catch all clients.

The user field accepts pattern characters as well (see note 574914):

* any sequence of characters (only the first * within the filter string is interpreted as a pattern character)

+ one character

# disable following pattern character

The user group field accepts exacts values only.

Using the print function (command PRINT) in transaction SM19 or using report RSAU_INFO_SYAG you can show an overview about the current settings.

List of events

If you miss some of the events described in this document then search for notes of application component BC-SEC-SAL.

Using note 1970644 you can get report RSAU_INFO_SYAG which shows all events of the Security Audit Log including a summarized status about the activation of the events. The detail view allows you to create an HTML-based event definition print list including the full documentation.

Within transaction SM19 you can use the system function =PRINT (respective the printer icon in the top icon row) to document the definition of static profiles as well as the current definition of the dynamic configuration. This list shows the details about all filter slots.

Events ordered by selected topics and security optimization projects:

Topic Keyword Description and references Message
BACK

RFC callback (note 2128095)

Project: “Secure RFC Callback”

DUI DUJ DUK
CCM_TOOLSET_STARTER BUX
CUSTOM Custom specific events using function module RSAU_WRITE_CUSTOMER_EVTS (note 1941526) DUX DUY DUZ
DEBUG Debugging (change mode) BUZ, CUL, CU_M, CUN, CUO, CUP, CUY (BUY is obsolete)
EHS-SADM (note 1792047) DUA DUB DUC DUD DUE DUF DUG
FILE

Directory Traversal (note 1497003)

Project: “Secure File access”

CUQ CUR CUS CUT DU5
OAUTH OAuth 2.0 (AU2) BUV BUW DUH
PAYLOAD CUU CUX
RAL Read Access Logging (note 1902280) BU0 CU0 DU0
RBAM Role Based Access Management in SAP Business ByDesign system (note 948275) BUI BUJ
REPORT

Report start

Project: “Avoid SA38 by using custom report transactions”

AUW AUX
RFC-TABLE

Generic table access via RFC using functions like RFC_READ_TABLE (note 1539105)

Project: “Secure standard table access (authorization object S_TABU_RFC)”

CUZ DU9
SACF

Switchable authorization scenarios, transaction SACF (note 2078596)

Project: “Secure RFC functions”

DUO DUP DUQ DUU DUV
SAML SAML Authentication, transaction SRTUTIL (note 1570266) (AU2) BUK BUL BUM BUN BUO BUP CUA CUB CUC CUD CUE CUF CUG CUH
SAP FTP

FTP server whitelist using table SAPFTP_SERVERS (note 1605054)

See note 2312710 for more information about these messages.

Project: “Secure SAP FTP”

DU1 DU2 DU3 DU4 DU5 DU6 DU7 DU8
SE16

Generic table access using transactions like SE16, SE16N, SM30, SM31, SM34, or SQV (note 2041892)

Project: “Secure standard table access (authorization object S_TABU_DIS, S_TABU_NAM)”

DU9
SLDW Generic whitelists DUL DUM DUN
SNC

SNC Client Encryption (note 2104732)

Project: “Encrypt SAPGUI comminication”

BUJ
TCODE Transactions AU3 AU4 AUP AUQ
USER Change user master data (not required as you get change documents anyway) BU2 AU8 AU7 AU9 AUA AUB AUD AUR AUS AUT AUU
WEB-SERVICE Web service calls (note 1620477) CUV CUW
XSRF XSRF attacks (note 1619912) BUS

Note 2073809 shows special documentation/changes about the messages

  • BUY (which is replaced by message CUL),
  • CUY (which is related to debugger messages BUZ, CUL, CU_M, CUN, CUO, CUP), and
  • CUZ (which is related to message DU9).

List of events from table TSL1D respective report RSAU_INFO_SYAG.

This list is a snapshot – check it in your system – with a comparison between release 702 and 740. Some of the new messages may be added with 731 or with downports already.

Audit Class Message ID Event class New in release Message
Dialog Logon AU1 Severe Logon successful (type=&A, method=&C)
Dialog Logon AU2 Critical Logon failed (reason=&B, type=&A, method=&C)
Dialog Logon AUC Non-Critical User Logoff
Dialog Logon AUM Critical with Monitor Alert User &B Locked in Client &A After Erroneous Password Checks
Dialog Logon AUN Critical User &B in Client &A Unlocked After Being Locked Due to Inval.Password Entered
Dialog Logon AUO Severe Logon Failed (Reason = &B, Type = &A)
Dialog Logon BUD Critical WS: Delayed logon failed (type &B, WP &C). Refer to Web service log &A.
Dialog Logon BUE Non-Critical WS: Delayed logon successful (type &B, WP &C). Refer to Web service log &A.
Dialog Logon BUI Critical SPNego replay attack detected (UPN=&A)
Dialog Logon BUK Non-Critical &A assertion used
Dialog Logon BUL Non-Critical &A: &B
Dialog Logon BUM Non-Critical Name ID of a subject
Dialog Logon BUN Non-Critical Attribute
Dialog Logon BUO Non-Critical Authentication assertion
Dialog Logon BUP Non-Critical &A
Dialog Logon BUQ Non-Critical Signed LogoutRequest accepted
Dialog Logon BUR Non-Critical Unsigned LogoutRequest accepted
Dialog Logon CU2 Severe 740 OAuth 2.0: Invalid access token received (reason=&A)
Dialog Logon CU3 Severe 740 OAuth 2.0: Insufficient OAuth 2.0 scope for requested resource (user=&A)
Dialog Logon CU4 Critical 740 OAuth 2.0: Logged-on client user &A not same as parameter client ID &B
Dialog Logon CU5 Severe 740 OAuth 2.0: Client &A requested invalid access grant type &B
Dialog Logon CU6 Critical 740 OAuth 2.0: Client ID &A in SAML assertion not same as client ID &B in request
Dialog Logon CU7 Severe 740 OAuth 2.0: Scope &B not permitted for client &C, user &D (cause=&A)
Dialog Logon CU8 Non-Critical 740 OAuth 2.0: Access token issued (client=&A, user=&B, grant type=&C)
Dialog Logon CU9 Non-Critical 740 OAuth 2.0: Valid access token received for user &A
Dialog Logon CUA Severe Rejected Assertion
Dialog Logon CUB Severe &A: &B
Dialog Logon CUC Severe &A
Dialog Logon CUD Severe Name ID of a subject
Dialog Logon CUE Severe Attribute
Dialog Logon CUF Severe Authentication Assertion
Dialog Logon CUG Severe Signed LogoutRequest rejected
Dialog Logon CUH Severe Unsigned LogoutRequest rejected
Dialog Logon DU0 Critical with Monitor Alert Invalid SAP GUI data
RFC Logon AU5 Non-Critical RFC/CPIC logon successful (type=&A, method=&C)
RFC Logon AU6 Critical RFC/CPIC logon failed, reason=&B, type=&A, method=&C
RFC Function Call AUK Non-Critical Successful RFC Call &C (Function Group = &A)
RFC Function Call AUL Critical Failed RFC Call &C (Function Group = &A)
RFC Function Call CUV Non-Critical Successful WS Call (service = &A, operation &B)
RFC Function Call CUW Critical Failed Web service call (service = &A, operation = &B, reason = &C)
RFC Function Call CUZ Critical Generic table access by RFC to &A with activity &B
RFC Function Call DU1 Severe FTP server whitelist is empty
RFC Function Call DU2 Severe FTP server whitelist is non-secure due to use of placeholders
RFC Function Call DU3 Critical Server &A is not contained in the whitelist
RFC Function Call DU4 Critical Connection to server &A failed
RFC Function Call DU5 Critical There is no logical file name for path &A
RFC Function Call DU6 Non-Critical Validation for &A successful
RFC Function Call DU7 Critical with Monitor Alert Validation for &A failed
RFC Function Call DU8 Non-Critical FTP connection request for server &A successful
RFC Function Call DUI Non-Critical RFC callback performed (destination &A, called &B, callback &C)
RFC Function Call DUJ Critical RFC callback rejected (destination &A, called &B, callback &C)
RFC Function Call DUK Critical RFC callback in simulation mode (destination &A, called &B, callback &C)
RFC Function Call DUR Non-Critical JSON RPC call of function module &A succeeded
RFC Function Call DUS Non-Critical JSON RPC call of function module &A failed
RFC Function Call DUT Critical Critical JSON RPC call of function module &A (S_RFC * authorization)
RFC Function Call FU1 Non-Critical 740 RFC function &B with dynamic destination &C was called in program &A
Transaction Start AU3 Non-Critical Transaction &A Started
Transaction Start AU4 Critical Start of transaction &A failed (Reason=&B)
Transaction Start AUP Severe Transaction &A Locked
Transaction Start AUQ Severe Transaction &A Unlocked
Transaction Start BUX Severe 740 Test message
Transaction Start CUI Non-Critical 740 Application &A started
Transaction Start CUJ Critical 740 Failed to start application &A (reason =&B)
Transaction Start DU9 Non-Critical Generic table access call to &A with activity &B (auth. check: &C )
Report Start AUW Non-Critical Report &A Started
Report Start AUX Severe Start Report &A Failed (Reason = &B)
User Master Record Change AU7 Critical User &A Created
User Master Record Change AU8 Severe User &A Deleted
User Master Record Change AU9 Severe User &A Locked
User Master Record Change AUA Severe User &A Unlocked
User Master Record Change AUB Severe Authorizations for User &A Changed
User Master Record Change AUD Severe User Master Record &A Changed
User Master Record Change AUR Severe &A &B Created
User Master Record Change AUS Severe &A &B Deleted
User Master Record Change AUT Severe &A &B Changed
User Master Record Change AUU Critical &A &B Activated
User Master Record Change BU2 Non-Critical Password changed for user &B in client &A
User Master Record Change BUV Critical 740 Invalid hash value &A. The context contains &B.
User Master Record Change BUW Critical 740 A refresh token issued to client &A was used by client &B.
User Master Record Change DUH Severe with Monitor Alert 740 OAuth 2.0: Token declared invalid (OAuth client=&A, user=&B, token type=&C)
Other events AU0 Non-Critical Audit – Test. Text: &A
Other events AUV Critical Digital Signature Error (Reason = &A, ID = &B)
Other events AUY Severe Download &A Bytes to File &C
Other events AUZ Severe Digital Signature (Reason = &A, ID = &B)
Other events BU0 Critical with Monitor Alert RAL configuration access: Action: &A, type: &B, name &C
Other events BU1 Critical with Monitor Alert Password check failed for user &B in client &A
Other events BU3 Critical with Monitor Alert Security check changed in export: Old value &A, new value &B
Other events BU4 Non-Critical Dynamic ABAP code: Event &A, event type &B, check total &C
Other events BU5 Severe ICF recorder entry executed for user &A (activity &B)
Other events BU6 Severe ICF recorder entry executed by user &A (&B, &C) (activity &D).
Other events BU7 Severe Administration setting was changed for ICF Recorder (Activity: &A)
Other events BU8 Critical Virus Scan Interface: Virus “&C” found by profile &A (step &B)
Other events BU9 Severe Virus Scan Interface: Error “&C” occurred in profile &A (step &B)
Other events BUA Severe WS: Signature check error (reason &B, WP &C). Refer to Web service log &A.
Other events BUB Severe WS: Signature insufficient (WP &C). Refer to Web service log &A.
Other events BUC Severe WS: Time stamp is invalid. Refer to Web service log &A.
Other events BUF Non-Critical HTTP Security Session Management was activated for client &A.
Other events BUG Critical with Monitor Alert HTTP Security Session Management was deactivated for client &A.
Other events BUH Severe with Monitor Alert HTTP Security Session of user &A (client &B) was hard exited
Other events BUJ Severe Non-encrypted &A communication (&B)
Other events BUS Critical &A: Request without sufficient security characteristic of address &B.
Other events BUT Severe 740 CRL download failed with error code &A
Other events BUU Critical 740 Certificate check for subject “&A” with profile &B failed (status &C)
Other events BUY Critical Field contents changed: &5&9&9&9&9&9
Other events BUZ Very Critical > in program &A, line &B, event &C
Other events CU0 Critical RAL Log Access: Action: &A
Other events CU1 Severe CU Test Message
Other events CUK Critical C debugging activated
Other events CUL Very Critical Field content changed: &A
Other events CU_M Very Critical Jump to ABAP Debugger: &A
Other events CUN Very Critical A manually caught process was stopped from within the Debugger (&A)
Other events CUO Very Critical Explicit database commit or rollback from debugger &A
Other events CUP Very Critical Non-exclusive debugging session started
Other events CUQ Severe Logical file name &A not configured. Physical file name &B not checked.
Other events CUR Severe Physical file name &B does not fulfill requirements from logical file name &A
Other events CUS Severe Logical file name &B is not a valid alias for logical file name &A
Other events CUT Severe Validation for logical file name &A is not active
Other events CUU Non-Critical Payload of PI/WS message &A was read | &B
Other events CUX Non-Critical Payload of postprocessing request &A read
Other events CUY Non-Critical > &A
Other events DUA Severe 740 EHS-SADM: Service &A created on host &B
Other events DUB Severe 740 EHS-SADM: Service &A started on host &B
Other events DUC Severe 740 EHS-SADM: Service &A ended on host &B
Other events DUD Severe 740 EHS-SADM: Service &A deleted on host &B
Other events DUE Non-Critical 740 EHS-SADM: Configuration of service &A changed on host &B
Other events DUF Non-Critical 740 EHS-SADM: File &A transferred from host &B
Other events DUG Non-Critical 740 EHS-SADM: File &A transferred to host &B
Other events DUL Non-Critical Check for &A in whitelist &B was successful
Other events DUM Severe with Monitor Alert Check for &A in whitelist &B failed
Other events DUN Critical with Monitor Alert Active whitelist &A changed ( &B )
Other events DUO Non-Critical Authorization check for object &A in scenario &B successful
Other events DUP Non-Critical Authorization check for object &A in scenario &B failed
Other events DUQ Critical with Monitor Alert Active scenario &A for switchable authorization checks changed – &B
Other events DUU Non-Critical Authorization check for user &C on object &A in scenario &B successful
Other events DUV Non-Critical Authorization check for user &C on object &A in scenario &B failed
Other events DUX Non-Critical 740 TEMP: Customer-specific event DUX &A &B &C &D
Other events DUY Non-Critical 740 TEMP: Customer-specific event DUY &A &B &C &D
Other events DUZ Non-Critical 740 TEMP: Customer-specific event DUZ &A &B &C &D
Other events EU3 Critical 750 &A change documents deleted without archiving (&B)
Other events FU2 Severe 740 Parsing of an XML data stream canceled for security reasons (reason = &A)
System / housekeeping AUE Very Critical Audit Configuration Changed
System / housekeeping AUF Very Critical Audit: Slot &A: Class &B, Severity &C, User &D, Client &E, &F
System / housekeeping AUG Very Critical Application Server Started
System / housekeeping AUH Very Critical Application Server Stopped
System / housekeeping AUI Very Critical Audit: Slot &A Inactive
System / housekeeping AUJ Very Critical with Monitor Alert Audit: Active Status Set to &1
System / housekeeping EU1 Very Critical 750 System changeability changed (&A to &B)
System / housekeeping EU2 Very Critical 750 Client setting for &A changed (&B)
System / housekeeping FU0 Very Critical 750 Exclusive security audit log medium changed (new status &1)

File format

Warning: The file format is defined SAP internally – it’s not an official definition which can be used freely. Use the information with care as storage and format can change with newer releases.

As of release 7.50 you can choose if log events are stored in the files as described in this section or in the database table RSAU_BUF_DATA or at both locations (see note 2191612).

Use report RSAU_SELECT_EVENTS to analyze the file format.

The audit files have a structured but variable record layout in unicode text format.

The administrative information is fixed, however, there exist 2 record formats depending on the existence of the additional field SLGLTRM2.

The data part, field SLGDATA, containing 64 characters has a variable sub-structure containing several parameter values. Often these values are separated by ‘&’ matching to the message variables &A, &B, etc. of the message definition. If you don’t find an ‘&’ than you will have fixed length parameter values matching to the message variables &n (n is a number describing the count of characters) within the message definition.

Relevant DDIC structures:

RSLGENTR SysLog entry

RSAUENTR2 Security Audit Log Entry Version 2 with Long Terminal Names

Example of an entry in a .aud file:

2AU520130409010803000505200009D9a234ba.pDOKUSTAR                        SAPMSSY1                              0201R&0                                                            h020co.pt.com     


This leads to the following file format:

Field Sub-field Length Description
SLGTYPE SysLog: LIKE structure RSLGETYP
SLGFTYP 1 Entry type: “q” = version 1 without field SLGLTRM2, “2” = version 2 including field SLGLTRM2
AREA 2 Message area
SUBID 1 Message name
SLGDATTIM Time stamp (CHAR 16)
DATE 8 Date in format YYYYMMDD
TIME 6 Time in format hhmmss
DUMMY 2 not used
SLGPROC SysLog: LIKE RSLGPID structure
UNIXPID 5 Process ID
TASKTNO 5 Task
SLGTTYP 2 Process type (short form)
SLGLTRM 8 Terminal name (truncated)
SLGUSER 12 User name
SLGTC 20 Transaction
SLGREPNA 40 Program
SLGMAND 3 Client
SLGMODE 1 External mode of an SAP dialog
SLGDATA 64 Variable message data
SLGLTRM2 20 Terminal name (continued), only available if SLGFTYP=2

You see,

  • the format of the variable message data
  • the message class (logon, transaction start, report start, RFC logon, user master record change, RFC start, miscellaneous, and system)
  • the severity (critical, important, non-critical)
  • and the monitoring alert settings (with, without)

are not visible within the file, but only in the message definition in table TSL1D (the key fields are AREA and SUBID).

Terminal ID versus IP Address

The Security Audit Log normally logs the terminal id if it’s available; otherwise the IP address is logged. You can set the (undocumented) profile parameter rsau/ip_only to the value 1 to log the IP address instead (if available). See note 1497445 for details.

Use the following options to get the terminal id and the IP address of active users:

  • Transaction SM04 shows the IP address of the GUI client as well if you change the layout. (Limited to currently active users.)
  • Table USR41 containing the last logon date shows both terminal id and the IP address in field TERMINAL. Maybe it’s possible to activate table logging using SE13 to get the history, too. Than you could merge this data with the log entries.
  • Maybe you can try to use user exit SUSR0001 to log IP address (from function TH_USER_INFO and/or table USR41) in a custom table or via creating additional Security Audit Log entries for message AU1 (sucessful logon) for which you e.g. set the parameter &A or a new parameter &B with the IP address. See function RSAU_WRITE_TRAC_AUDIT_LOG to understand how to create such entries. (Limited to dialog logon only.)

There exist strong limitations of logging terminal ID and IP address in ABAP. A malicious user could spoof the terminal ID easily. The IP address can be problematic, too. For example if a reverse proxy (e.g. web dispatcher) for HTTP access is used, then all users will have the same IP address.

(German) Data Protection

Would the German Data protection authorities have an issue with activating this level of logging?

From a general point of view I would start with following assumptions:

1. Filter: Activate everything which is critical for all users ‘*‘ in all clients  ‘*‘.

➙ mostly ok, details should be confirmed

2. Filter: Activate everything for users ‘SAP*‘ in all clients ‘*

➙ ok

3. Filter: Activate everything for other support and emergency users, e.g. ‘FF*‘ (FireFighter) in all clients ‘*

➙ ok (assuming that you already have agreed on using GRC Super User Management)

4. Filter: Activate all events for the dialog activities ‘logon’ and ‘transaction’ for user ‘DDIC‘ in all clients.

➙ ok

5. Filter: Activate everything for client ‘066‘. This client is not used anymore and can be deleted.

➙ ok

6. Filter: Activate RFC events (AUL, AUK, AU6, AU5) for a short time for selected users to identity RFC connection problems easily

➙ you have to confirm this

7.-10. Filter: free for other project specific purpose

➙ you have to confirm this

Keep in mind that you have to discuss (among others) log creation, consolidation, archiving as well as retention periods and deletion.

Example from a German project (2010/2011) which was cleared through German, Austrian, French & Belgian data controllers:

Logging everything was OK as there is are legitimate reasons for it.  The following additional controls were required:

  • Access to logs limited to Basis & Security team
  • Acceptable use (of logs) policy circulated to everyone with access
  • Data had to be summarized before use (e.g. could not be easily attributable to an individual.  Obviously difficult to achieve if someone is in a team of 1…)
  • Distribution of data outside security team had to be approved by local data controller (local to the people who’s data it was).
  • Detailed records existing outside the system had to be deleted after the summation work had been completed

Exceptions to these included:

  • legitimate use of data in event of security breach (agreed by local counsel and data controllers)
  • use of data with written approval of user (we used this a lot when redesigning access based on patterns of ‘model’ users).

I just found an additional recommendation about the protection of the files in a recent note:

In general, files of the Security Audit Log must not be accessed by other ABAP programs than the Security Audit Log application itself. Protect the files by assigning the appropriate S_DATASET authorizations to your users and by using S_PATH protection as described in note 177702. For this purpose, use an own dedicated folder for Security Audit Log files. Enter this directory into the SPTH table and enable the flags FS_NOWRITE and FS_NOREAD, thus disabling any read or write access from ABAP to this directory. Configure the Security Audit Log (parameter DIR_AUDIT) to use this directory.

GRC Fire Fighter logging

The application GRC Access Control Super User Management (aka FireFighter) consolidates logs from various sources:

  • Transaction Log: Captures transaction execution from transaction STAD
  • Change Log: Captures change log from change document objects (tables CDPOS and CDHDR)
  • System Log: Captures Debug & Replace information from transaction SM21
  • Security Audit Log: Captures Security Audit Log from transaction SM20
  • OS Command Log: Captures changes to OS commands from transaction SM49

Because of this we recommend to define a filter in the Security Audit Log which records all events for fire fighter users.

Performance

Q: Is there a significant performance impact (or any impact at all) if we enable the security audit log with the recommended settings? We’ve had resistance from some clients as they were worried that it will impact on the end user experience / slow down the system.

Unfortunately the FAQ note 539404 does not talk much about performance.

Well, the general rule is simple: There is no performance impact, not in time nor in space, if you log unsuccessful (=critical) events as these events happens rarely.

As soon as you start logging successful events you might look to space – the growing size of the audit files – but still not to time, as the Security Audit Log is optimized for speed.

Ertunga Arsal has written some noteworthy blogs about performance analysis of the Security Audit Log:

Conclusion: you do not need to care about time, and space is only important if you log specific successful events:

RFC function called (AUK which take >70% of the space), Sucessful RFC logon (AU5 which take >15%), Successful Web Service Call (CUV which take >10% if the system utilises web services extensively), Report started (AUW which take >5%).

How to create customer-specific events

Using notes 1941526 and 1941568 you can utilize the custom messages DUX, DUY and DUZ in SAP_BASIS release as of 7.30. Call function RSAU_WRITE_CUSTOMER_EVTS to create these messages.

You can “reuse” other codes, i.e. CUY if you ensure that you still will be able to distinguish the messages. Nevertheless, you should interpret it as a (logical) modification of the SAP Standard.

in addition there exist other options to log custom specific events:

– Application Log in ABAP

– CCMS Alerts

– Alerts send to the SAP Solution Manager

How to read the long texts of events

You can view the long text of Security Audit Log event messages using transaction SE92 (or in transaction SE61 if you choose the document class SL (Syslog).

Using note 1970644 you can get report RSAU_INFO_SYAG which shows all events of the Security Audit Log including the current status of activation. The detail view allows you to create an HTML-based event definition print list including the full documentation.

How to log critical debugger events

Using the debugger in general might already be seen as critical but using debug-replace is considered as very critical by all auditors. The corresponding Security Audit Log messages for changing field content and for jumping within the code

  • Other Events, Critical, CUL Field content changed: &A
  • Other Events, Critical, CU_M Jump to ABAP Debugger: &A

are already covered by the 1st filter “Activate everything which is critical for all users in all clients” as proposed above.

These both messages are extended by another message to add more details describing the event:

  • Other Events, Critical, BUZ > in program &A, line &B, event &C

The messages CUK, CUN, CUO, and CUP are related to the debugger as well.

How to track changes on the settings

Dynamic settings

The effective (dynamic) settings get logged in the Security Audit Log itself.

If you create – as recommended – a filter for “all clients, all users, all audit classes with severity ‘critical'” than you already get the corresponding events of audit class “System”:

System Critical AU E Audit Configuration Changed
System Critical AU F Audit: Slot &A: Class &B, Severity &C, User &D, Client &E, &F
System Critical AU G Application Server Started
System Critical AU H Application Server Stopped
System Critical AU I Audit: Slot &A Inactive
System Critical AU J Audit: Active Status Set to &1

Static settings

The static settings are stored in table RSAUPROF. The system create table logs for any changes which you can view, i.e using report RSTBHIST.

The name of the active profile which is used while starting an application server is stored in field CURRPROF of the entry with PROFNAME = $CURPROF.

You can transport static profiles using a workbench transport which get transport entries for R3TR TABU RSAUPROF with table key PROFNAME=<profile name> SLOTNO=*. (You can transport the entry for $CURPROF as well, but I recommend to choose the active profile in the target system manually.)

As of SAP_BASIS 7.40 you can use transaction SM19 to add static filter definitions to a transport. See FAQ Note 539404 item [8].

The filters are stored in the entries having field SLOTNO > 0.

Field STATUS shows if a filter is active.

Field CLASSES shows the active audit classes. This is a bit-field summing up the values for the different audit classes (see include RSAUCONSTANTS):

CONSTANTS: RSAU_CLASS_OTHER(4)    TYPE x VALUE 1,
          RSAU_CLASS_LOGIN(4)    TYPE x VALUE 2,
          RSAU_CLASS_TASTART(4)  TYPE x VALUE 4,
          RSAU_CLASS_REPORT(4)  TYPE x VALUE 8,
          RSAU_CLASS_RFCLOGIN(4) TYPE x VALUE 16,
          RSAU_CLASS_USER(4)    TYPE x VALUE 32,
          rsau_class_system(4)  type x value 64,
          RSAU_CLASS_RFCCALL(4)  TYPE x VALUE 128.

The audit class “System” is implicitly active and is not added, therefore you get the value CLASSES = 191 = 128 + 32+16+8+4+2+1 if you activate all audit classes.

Field SEVERITY shows the severity (see include RSAUCONSTANTS):

CONSTANTS: RSAU_SEVE_LOW      TYPE I VALUE 2,
          RSAU_SEVE_MED      TYPE I VALUE 5,
          RSAU_SEVE_HIGH    TYPE I VALUE 9.

If you have selected the detail settings, then field SELVAR contains the constant 01 (and field CLASSES = 0 and SEVERITY = 0). Field MSGVECT defines active events. (In this case you can deactivate “System” events.)

Active events are identified using individual bits at specific positions within field MSGVECT. The position is calculated using the alphanumerical order 0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ  according to the SUBID of the events. The event area (AUBUCU, DU, EU) defines the bit which is added to the value on that position: AU = 80 (hex), BU = 40 (hex), CU = 20 (hex), DU = 10 (hex), EU = 08 (hex).

Only the first 36 positions of field MSGVECT are used. Every position holds two bytes therefore you see two hexadecimal characters per position.

Example showing active system events only (AUE AUF AUG AUH AUI AUJ):

MSGVECT  000000000000000000000000000080808080808000000000000000000000000000000000…

SUBID     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Position -1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9–11–13–15–17–19–21–23–25–27–29–31–33–35–…

Change Reporting in the SAP Solution Manager

In addition to the local table logs of table RSAUPROF you can use the applications Change Reporting and Configuration Validation in the SAP Solution Manager to analyse changed settings. Use the configuration store AUDIT_CONFIGURATION. Be aware that the extractor gets a snapshot of the dynamic settings daily – that means it shows the effective settings according to profile parameters respective the overriding kernel parameters. Changes between two executions of the extractor are not cached. The configuration store does not show the user account who triggered the change. Therefore I recommend to use Change Reporting or Configuration Validation as a trigger for deeper analysis of the local table logs.

see: Configuration Validation Home

http://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/display/TechOps/ConfVal_Home

➙ Content of CCDB for a Technical System of type ABAP ➙ …

http://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/display/TechOps/ConfVal_ABAP_Content#ConfVal_ABAP_Content-AUDIT_CONFIGURATION

What is the meaning of message BU4?

Question: I our productive environment am getting many times the message BU4 “Dynamic ABAP Coding: Event &A Event Type: &B Checksum: &C” but according to your post (and my old screen capture) the BU4 message should be for “Transport Request &A Contains Security-Critical Source Objects“.

I searched but could not find anything about this issue…what do you recommend beside good luck :-)?

Answer: The definition of the message BU4 in transaction SE92 might be still wrong depending on the release of the system. According to note 539404 recording the events to transport security-relevant objects (BU3, BU4) is not yet implemented.

The Kernel creates message BU4 “Dynamic ABAP Coding: Event &A Event Type: &B Checksum: &C” to flag usage of

  • I‘ for INSERT REPORT
  • G‘ for GENERATE SUBROUTINE POOL
  • D‘ for DELETE REPORT

if setting in SM19 at ‘Other entries’ for ‘Audit of generated dynamic ABAP’ is active.

(In addition entries in the db tables DYNABAPHDR and DYNABAPSRC are written if profile parameter abap/dyn_abap_log is set to the value “on“.)

How can I read events using BAPIs?

The security alerts are also available to external programs using BAPIs (Business Application Programming Interfaces). The report RSAU_READ_AUDITLOG_EXTERNAL is a sample SAP program that you can use as a template for accessing the security alerts using BAPIs.

How to get a cross-reference about the creation of messages?

If you want to know which program triggers which message you can use the cross-reference feature of the development environment. Well, messages are no repository objects, therefore you cannot use it directly. However, many but not all messages are triggered by specific functions of methods per scenario. You can use the cross-reference for these triggers.

Have a look to method GET_TRIGGER_FOR_MSG of class CL_INFO_SYAG to view the list of triggers which are used to create audit messages. Then go for the cross-reference in transaction SE80 or SE84 for these functions and methods.

How to avoid logging for Auto-ABAP (SAPSYS) processing

If you do not want to log Security Audit Log events for Auto-ABAP processing (aka “SAPSYS processing”) even if you log all events for user pattern SAP* you can assign a different username to this type of processing by setting following profile parameters:

rdisp/autoabapuser

rdisp/bgrfc_watchdog_user

To define the value for these profile parameters you enter the client, a comma and the user.

Example: 000,ZSAPSYS

This user has to exist in the choosen client with sufficient authorizations!

Create this user with user type B=system, no password and a role which contains at least following authorizations (you may start with full authorizations and use transaction STAUTHTRACE for a while to get the list of required authorizations):

Authorization object S_ADMI_FCD

with field S_ADMI_FCD = PADM, ST0R

Authorization object S_BTCH_ADM

with field BTCADMIN = Y

Authorization object S_DATASET

with fields

ACTVT = 33

FILENAME = *

PROGRAM = RSCORE00, SSFALRTEXP

Authorization object S_RZL_ADM

with field ACTVT = 01, 03

This tip was developed by a customer based on information within note 2288530. The customer has an even stronger requirement as mentioned above because they want to log everything in all clients for all users with just the exception to omit logging for Auto-ABAP processing. This customer use a special variation of the trick:

Auto-ABAP processing is executed by user SAPSYS______ (12 characters).

No other user name is longer than 11 characters.

The filter im transaction SM19 for the user name is defined as +++++++++++ (11 characters).

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23 Comments

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  1. Ufuk Yavuz

    Hi Frank,

     

     

    We need to analyze specific transaction runs of specific users for a long period of time like 3 months? Unfortunately sm20 is so slow and we couldnt get result although we use username and transaction code filters in one run. Is there any other way or tool to analyze and display that audit log files quickly?

    (0) 
    1. Greg Capps

      Do you have GRC Access Control?  The Action Usage Sync pulls this data into the GRACACTUSAGE table which has analysis programs.  You can also query this data very quickly and easily by user.

      (0) 
    1. Frank Buchholz Post author

      The security alerts are also available to external programs using BAPIs (Business Application Programming Interfaces). The report RSAU_READ_AUDITLOG_EXTERNAL is a sample SAP program that you can use as a template for accessing the security alerts using BAPIs.

      (0) 
  2. Dominik van den Hout

    Hi does anyone know when Event CUK (C Debugging activated) is raised?

    I found no possibility to activate C debugging, so I was not able to generate this event.

     

    Thanks

     

    Dominik

    (0) 
  3. Gary Ault

    I’ve found the Perl script in thread 677226 to be very useful.  The file it creates from the audit log can be searched with grep or imported into a spreadsheet.

    (0) 
  4. Thomas Glaesker

    Hello Frank,

     

    we get this in our audit log as we switched on Audit Class Dialog Login.

    I don’t like to have in type=B Background neither want to switch off event class Severe.

    So we get events from any batch job, which is uncritical. Severe would by type=A Dialog login itself.

     

    Audit Class

    Message ID Event class New in release Message
    Dialog Logon AU1 Severe Logon successful (type=B, method=&C)
    (0) 
  5. Global Software Development ERP adidas-Group

    Great blog on the security audit log. Fortunately SAP is good in logging, although the SAL by far does not cover for all vulnerabilities and we also miss out on the aggregation and correlation logic which may show patterns of relatively harmless actions sudden look like a SAP attack pattern.

    For that reason we did a deep dive and now evaluate a tool that actually accesses all available logs sources (SAL, system log, user master, change logs, …) and reports events in real-time using predefined identification patterns.  SecurityBridge, written by ABAP-Experts, removes the noise form the music when it comes to alert generation.  The complexity for analysing logs and evaluation threats is boxed into predefined event listeners. Furthermore it also provides a plug & play link in order to connect your SAP instances to any SIEM solution.

    Best Regards,
    Ivan Mans
     

    (0) 
  6. Christian Mika

    Hello Frank,
    thanks for providing such detailed Information! It was helpful for us when we started with SAL.
    Meanwhile we face another challenge: We’d like to have a logging for any access to the file System (incl. also RZ10, SM37).

    As Long as I understand your examples, this is not covered yet (“Project: “Secure File access”). Until now, we only get information to logical file names (TC FILE). We also did not find any relevant Events by checking the description of the  Message IDs.

    => Q: Do you know whether it is possible to get this Information out of SM19/SM20?

    Best regards,
    Christian

    (0) 
    1. Frank Buchholz Post author

      The SAL records events related to logical file names – but it does not log any file access which is not related to a logical file name (the log is written within functions like FILE_VALIDATE_NAME etc. but not inside of the ABAP statement OPEN DATASET).

      About RZ10: As far as I know there is are logical file names used in RZ10. -> No log about file access

      About SE37: Well, it’s not the SE37 which might access files directly. It’s a function module which you start via SE37. Only if this function uses logical file names you would get log entries.

       

      Kind regards

      Frank Buchholz
      SAP CoE Security Services

      (0) 
      1. Christian Mika

         

        Hello Frank,
        thank you for the explanation!

        So, as long as I understand, if we want such file system access logged, we have to ensure that only logical file names are used and so we have to avoid respective inhibit the use of physical file names. I suppose this can/has to be done via SAP authorizations (e.g. allow only file names that are partly qualified via fixed prefix) or via restriction of specific ABAP statements (like OPEN DATASET) or anything like that.

        Hm, I think we need to investigate any further…

        Best regards,
        Christian

        (0) 

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